New Delhi, Oct 10 Pakistan could never imagine that a group it once raised and used to spread terror in neighbouring countries would one day run a government and realise that diplomacy does not flow out of the barrel of a gun.
When on the receiving end, Pakistan's Defence Minister Khawaja Asif stated that Islamabad has "run out" of patience over the use of Afghan soil by “terrorists targeting Pakistan”.
He has also made a bizarre statement, claiming that Afghans have always stood beside India “yesterday, today, and tomorrow”.
If indeed his country had offered support to Afghan refugees, it was to raise a militia, not out of compassion. And all these rhetorics come when Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi is visiting India.
Pakistan has itself soured its relationship with the Taliban, attacking Afghanistan’s border areas, even resorting to aerial bombing, and driving back thousands of refugees from its land to an uncertain future.
Kabul has always refused to recognise the Durand Line – then hurriedly drawn by British occupiers – as a legitimate border.
The porous areas have witnessed intermittent skirmishes, affecting trade and transit. After the withdrawal of US-led troops, Islamabad expected the Taliban to remain eternally grateful and jump to its bidding, but the regime’s assertiveness has disrupted that. Kabul’s diplomatic overtures towards New Delhi have unsettled Pakistan.
While India does not officially recognise the Taliban regime, its pragmatic engagement signals a shift in Kabul’s foreign policy orientation. For Pakistan, this represents a strategic loss and a potential threat.
India's growing ties with Kabul, combined with its strategic partnership with Iran, amplify these fears.
Possible increase in India’s diplomatic and trade relation with nations in Pakistan’s immediate neighbourhood blow winds of caution for Islamabad.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s economic ties with Afghanistan have also suffered, with border closures, refugee deportations, and diplomatic tensions having disrupted transit routes.
India’s investment in alternative corridors like the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and Chabahar bypasses Pakistan entirely.
But following the re-imposition of sanctions against Iran and the Chabahar Port in particular, foreign companies became reluctant to participate in the port's expansion.
India took over operations in 2018, and used it for trade with Iran and other countries, and also send relief materials to Kabul. Islamabad is eyeing Muttaqi’s India visit warily, fearing diplomatic isolation, where, with India engaging Afghanistan, Iran, and other Central Asian nations, Pakistan risks being left out of regional dialogues.
Increased Indian presence could lead to constricting its operations in intelligence gathering, surveillance, and influence over the region. Thus, Afghanistan’s tilt towards India adds pressure on Pakistan’s western flank.
The Taliban’s refusal to act as Islamabad’s proxy and India’s growing goodwill among Afghans have reshaped the strategic landscape. Pakistan’s view of India’s advantage in Afghanistan is shaped by a sense of strategic reversal.
What was once a zone of influence has become a source of insecurity.
India’s soft-power diplomacy, infrastructure investments, and pragmatic engagement with the Taliban have allowed it to gain ground practically without boots on the ground.
Islamabad now faces two main challenges – managing deteriorating ties with the Taliban and countering India’s expanding influence. But given utterances like those by Khawaja Asif, both seem distant for Pakistan.
As regional dynamics evolve, Afghanistan will remain a critical point in South Asia’s geopolitical chessboard – one where Pakistan’s traditional playbook may no longer suffice.
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