As NATO eyes Indo-Pacific, India offers strategic depth without alignment

New Delhi, June 29 The NATO summit held in The Hague on June 24-25 may be remembered less for its urgent reaffirmations -- support for Ukraine, increased defence spending, and condemnation of Iranian strikes -- than for a more disciplined, forward-looking pivot: the Indo-Pacific now occupies a central place in NATO's strategic imagination as the Indo-Mediterranean plunges into conflict.

This is no small shift. For much of its post–Cold War history, NATO's gaze remained firmly Atlantic. Even when it extended outward -- toward Afghanistan or Libya -- it did so from the assumption that security threats radiated outward from Europe. The idea that Asia could shape Euro-Atlantic stability was once considered speculative. That assumption has now collapsed.

NATO's engagement with the Indo-Pacific predates the Ukraine war. In the late 2010s and early 2020s, the alliance began quietly deepening ties with democratic Indo-Pacific partners -- Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand -- eventually institutionalising these relationships through the "IP4" format. Yet it was Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and China's subsequent strategic alignment with Moscow that sharpened the view from Brussels. The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept explicitly stated that China's "coercive policies challenge our interests, security, and values." At The Hague, that posture hardened. China was identified not only as a systemic rival but as a "decisive enabler" of Russia's war machine.

Even so, NATO's ambitions remain limited by design. The alliance does not seek to become an Indo-Pacific bloc. It cannot, and should not, replicate its Euro-Atlantic structure in Asia. Instead, it is seeking what might be called "strategic elasticity" -- flexible partnerships, practical coordination, and technological interoperability that enhance deterrence without requiring formal alignment.

This is where India enters the picture -- not as an ally, but as a necessary partner.

India remains committed to strategic autonomy and non-alignment. It is not part of the IP4, nor will it seek NATO membership or treaty-bound commitments. New Delhi has historically resisted bloc politics and retains strong historical ties to Moscow, even as it seeks to diversify its defence posture. But that autonomy should not be mistaken for passivity. In recent years, India has developed a proactive Indo-Pacific agenda, exemplified by its SAGAR doctrine -- Security and Growth for All in the Region -- and more recently, the 'Mahasagar' initiative, announced in late 2024.

Mahasagar (Sanskrit for "great ocean") signals India's intent to become the principal architect of stability in the Western Indo-Pacific. It combines maritime domain awareness, defence-industrial cooperation, and blue economy coordination across the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the African littoral.

Importantly, it also envisions interoperability with like-minded navies and integration of undersea surveillance and cyber capabilities. While not aimed at any single actor, Mahasagar is a clear strategic counterweight to China's Belt and Road naval encirclement of the Indian Ocean.

India's role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) -- alongside the United States, Japan, and Australia -- already positions it as a key player in balancing China's influence. Yet the Quad is not a military alliance. It operates through consensus and capacity building.

NATO, on the other hand, brings something complementary to India's toolbox: institutional experience, shared standards, and operational maturity across cyber, AI, and undersea deterrence. Where the Quad offers alignment of vision, NATO offers alignment of capability.

There are already examples of what this looks like in practice. In 2024, India conducted joint exercises with the Italian aircraft carrier Nave Cavour, demonstrating high-level interoperability. It has participated in multilateral operations like Sea Dragon alongside the United States, Japan, Australia, and Canada. NATO, for its part, has established pathways for defence tech integration with partners in the region.

At The Hague, it unveiled new initiatives in cyber defence, counter-disinformation, AI, and dual-use industrial cooperation -- all areas where India has growing interest and capability.

Of course, these engagements will not lead to formal alliance structures. New Delhi will not sign a collective defence pact, nor will it open NATO bases. But this is not what the moment demands. What it demands is pragmatic, modular cooperation -- shared exercises, aligned technical standards, and secure communication frameworks that allow both sides to respond jointly to maritime instability, cyber threats, and supply chain vulnerabilities.

There is also a deeper, systemic rationale for engagement. Trade routes through the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait are not abstract concerns for Europe. Nearly 40 per cent of global trade flows through these waters. A limited conflict -- say, over Taiwan -- would immediately disrupt global supply chains, raise commodity prices, and destabilise energy flows. Euro-Atlantic security, in other words, is no longer bounded by geography; it is bounded by connectivity. And India, situated at the strategic hinge of East and West, is uniquely positioned to help NATO manage this transition.

None of this negates India's long-standing preference for autonomy. In fact, NATO's appeal lies precisely in its ability to work with India without violating that principle. What is emerging is a partnership without alliance -- a relationship grounded in complementary interests, not identical identities.

Looking ahead, NATO must resist the temptation to replicate its Atlantic formula in the Indo-Pacific. Instead, it should build on the logic of flexible geometry: deep engagement with the IP4, tailored cooperation with India, and cross-platform initiatives involving the Quad and EU Indo-Pacific strategies. For India, this is an opportunity to shape the regional order without surrendering independence. For NATO, it is a way to remain globally relevant without overreaching.

The future of deterrence will not be defined by static treaties but by dynamic networks. As the international order frays and new coalitions emerge, NATO and India have a narrow but vital opportunity to build one of the most consequential security partnerships of the century -- one that respects autonomy, avoids entanglement, and is anchored in shared strategic necessity.

Vas Shenoy is the Chief Representative for Italy, Indian Chamber of Commerce. He is an Italian analyst, author and entrepreneur.

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